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This essay tries to expound a conception of interval measures that pennits a particular 
approach to partial ignorance decision problems. l'he \ irtue of this approach for artificial 
reasoning systems is mat me following questions become moot: 1. which secondary crircnon ro 
apply after maximi1.ing expected util ity . and �- how much indeterminacy to represent. The cost of 
the approach is the need for explicit epistemological foundations: for instance, a role ofacceptana 
with a parameter that allows various attitudes toward error. Note that epistemological foundations 
are already desirable for independent reasons. 
The development is as follows: L. probability intervals are useful and natural in A.l. svstems: 
2. wide intervals avoid error, but are useless in some risk-sensitive decision-making; 3. yet one 
may obtain narrower, or otherwise decisive intervals with a more relaxed attitude toward error: 4. 
if bodies of knowledge can be ordered by their attitude to error, one should perfonn the decision 
analysis with the acceptable body of knowledge that allows the least error, of those that are useful. 
The resulting behavior differs from that of a Bayesian probabilist because in the proposal. 5. 
intervals based on .;;uccessive bodies of l<nowledge are not always nested: 6. the use of a probability 
for a particular decision does not require commitment to the probability for credence: and 7. there 
may be no accepcahte body of knowledge that is useful: hence. sometimes no decision is mandated. 
I. lnterval Measures. 
By now. the use of an interval measure is 
regarded highly for probability judgements in 
reasoning systems. Researchers selecting formalisms 
for quantifying belief have all recognized the vmucs ot' 
(partial)l indeterminacy in probability judgement 
([Bar8l], [GLF8l], [Dil82}, [Low82].[WeH82]. [Qui83J. 
[Wes83] , [Gin84), (LuS84), [Str84). etc.l. 
[ntervals allow varying degrees of commitment 
in probability assertion. At the extreme-;, · P( �) = [0. 
1)' is uncommitted. while· P( A)= [ .76 . .76)' is 
consummate. Some ha•e Jrgued that indeterminacy 
captures "pre-systematic" notions of belief and 
disbelief [Sha 76), (Lev80a). 2 Since 0 � inf P( A) + inf 
P(- A) � L the agent can assign Lero belief to a 
proposition even though he ts not certain that it is 
talse. Indeterminacy is useful co the subjectivist when 
eliciting bounds on probabilities (especially from 
equivocating experts). and to the empiricist for 
expressing the Neyman-Pearson contidence results of 
%(A, Q):::: 1- 8, then %(A, P&Q) = [1 - e - 8. 1). 
[f probabilities are based on direct inference from the 
class A, the probability of" Px & Qx" for some x E .l 
·.vould be an interval, desp 1tc having started w ith 
probabilities that were points (see (TSD83j. (Che8.�). 
and [Nil841). 
Many advocates of in ten al belief mca-;ure.., m 
\.1. link their argumenrs to Shater·� interprewtion 
[Sha 76] of Dempster's inference system {Dem68). 
Shafer's theory is claimed to provide a valuable 
representation of intervals (via mass functions). and a 
simple, consistent approach to resolving apparent 
disputes when combining evidence (via Dempster's 
rule). These claims are evaluated elsewhere [Kyb85]. 
[Lev80a), (Zad79). Shafer's theory is not unique in its 
abili�y to cope with disagreeing evidence: indeed. a 
system of belief would be impoverished if it made no 
provisions tl.>r disagrcemenc (see Levi's remarks 
[T .ev80a) : also. there are indeterminate systems due to 
Levi. Smith. Schiele Gnod. and Kyburg). Further. 
pnpulation sampling. 
Dempster's ntle for combining evidence is relatively 
fntenalism is also natural in decachmem. When 
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presumptuous as a form of conditionalization [Dem68], the decision problem: which act should be chosen 
[Lcv80b]. [Kyb85]. among available acts. when the agent is not indifferent 
Putting aside the prospects for Dempster's ntlc. about them all'? In the estimation problem. error is 
we arc left with these indeterminate probabilities, and avoided by using intervals. In the decision problem. 
with an ensuing decision problem. Barnett [Bar81] and ambiguity is avoided by eschewing intervals. [n order 
Lowrance [Low82] have both suggested that a research to solve both problems simultaneously, there must be 
goal should be a fully developed decision theory based some compromise. 
on interval measures. 
Luce and Raiffa call decision problems with 
indeterminate probabilities "partial ignorance" 
problems. and earlier work on partial ignorance is 
discussed in [Lou85]. Wesley, Lowrance. and Garvey 
[WLG84] offer a candidate theory that is for usc with 
Shaferian beliefs and that ignores risk; it has been 
discussed elsewhere [Lou84]. 
[!. Fstim;uion and Decision. 
With interval probabilities ur imenal utilties. 
expected utilities are intervals. !f interval probabilities 
arc narrow (or otherwise fortmtousl there is no 
III. Secondary Criterion Solutions. 
Let n be the largest set of probability 
distributions satisfying all of the interval constraints. 
Calculating expected utilities in the usual way. for act 
a;\. in the presence of uncertaimics �:·1: 
uk(a;\_) = L {Pk(l:}z;....)u(<F;. a;\>H 
'V Ei; 
U(a�) = { uk(a;\): Pk En }: 
u(a;\_) = [infU(aA..). sup U(u;....)J. 
The natural way to (partial-) order acts with 
indeterminate utilities is b� dominance: ,z1 > a�, iff in/ 
U(al) >sup U(a2). If there IS a unique max1mal 
problem: expected utility imervals can be ordered in element in the order. a*. then the decision problem is 
the natural way (see below). and the best act identified. solved. The probabilities. though individually 
In a 1: !lottery that depends on the outcome of a coin 
wss. if ?(heads) is [.7 .. 8] the decision should be clear 
via the obvious ordering: if it is [.3 . .  8], the decision 
indeterminate. are nevertheless collecti' ely decisive. 
But in general. there will be some set llfmaxima. {a1}. 
Some authors ([Hur51]. [Goo83]. [Fis65], 
may not be clear. The decision may also not be clear tf (I .ev80b]) suggest that a* can be identtfied in the 
the interval is narrow. but unfortuitous. e.g .. (.49 . .52]. maximal set by one of the so-called weaker methods: 
If the maximization of expected U[ility (MEL) is maximin. min-regret. or lexi-min methods. These are 
the sole solution criterion. there may be no defensible the methods recommended for decision problems 
ordering of the utility Intervals that identities a best 
act. Of course. \tEL' with point- probabilities can be 
ambiguous too. This latter ambiguity is often 
tolerated: if two acts have the exact same expected 
utility. the sameness of utility is supposed to reflect 
inditference. But ambiguity with interval probabilities 
may not be tolerable because intervals often model 
ignorance. not indifference. It is not the case that the 
two acts couldn't be ordered in a relevant and 
accountable way. Rather. not enough is known to 
order them. 
f"here are two problems here. First. there is the 
estimation problem: �Nhat should be the degree of 
certaim' attributed to a proposition? Second. there is 
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under uncertainty. and their common character that is 
cmcial here is that they make no use of probability 
judgement. Presumably the probability information 
has been milked for all it is worth. under the primary 
method of MEU. and secondary methods will tin ish 
the job of identifying a*. Unless there is an unforseen 
equality of point-valued utilities. the �Neaker method 
guarantees identifying a unique act. rhe weaker 
method could ha\ e been applied in the fif'it place but 
for its admitted weakness. It is considered weak 
precisely because it ignores probability judgement. It 
is employed -secondanly precisely because it 
presupposes that probabillt\ judgement will be of no 
further use. �,�, hich is exact! y the case among the 
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maximal set after the application of MEU. 
For programmed systems. there is still the 
problem of choosing one from among the various 
secondary criteria. Clearly there are situations in 
which maximin is inappropriate, and similarly for min­
regret. for optimism-pessimrsm. etc. Supervaluations 
would be cautious, but impotent; taking the most 
popular mandate among various criteria would be ad 
hoc. One could attempt to discriminate those 
situations in which one method applies and others do 
not. but no such attempt has been successful. 
IV. A Different Proposal. 
Here is an entirely difterent way of solving 
partial ignorance problems. l f  MEU with the given 
probability intervals is indecisive. M FL can be 
retained and the probability intervals refined. ln the 
Bayesian tradition. retinement of Intervals is done 
subjectively. lA ith no additional empirical information. 
In the \ieyman-Pearson tradition. retinement is done 
objectively and requires additional empirical 
information. In either case. retinement further 
determines probabilities. An automatic reasoning 
system may be required to be objective. may not have 
recourse to additional information. and may require 
the preservation of indeterminacy. Fortunately, it's 
possible to refine intervals objectively, with no 
additional empirical information. and without losing 
the indeterminacy of probabilities. This latter 
possibility is presented more carefullj in [I ou85]. 
f .et credal "tate be described not by one set of 
feasible distributions. n. but by a sequence of sets. 
<ni>. Each n is based on a body of knowledge 
formed with some quantifiable attitude toward error 
(so there is a companion sequence. <Ki>· where each 
body of knowledge, K. has an integer index dnd a real 
error). Successive K's are more informative. but 
predecessors are less prone to error. Each 
indeterminate expected utility calculation is done with 
respect to one element in the n -sequence. but the 
lA hole n -sequence constitutes the credal state. 
purposes of  decision without changing the 
indeterminacy of the credal state. 
This representation finesses the question of how 
narrow intervals ought to be. Imagine the expert who 
first reports the interval is [.3, .7], but can be coaxed 
into reporting to the more useful [.35, .65]. Which 
interval gets represented? In this proposal. both 
should be represented. Intervals should be as narrow 
as permitted given the magnitude of error (a) 
associated with the body of knowledge on which the 
intervals are based. K(a)· They will be [0. 1] in no. 
They may be degenerate in the very late n·s. And they 
should be variously narrow (though not necessarily 
nested) in between. 
In practice, this proposal requires additional 
represented information. or additional interence rules 
and epistemological assumptions. It may be possible 
simply to assert and to represent both sequences. <Oi> 
and <Ki>· But more likely, O's will have to be 
generated from K's. and successive K's from �orne 
initial base. Kinit' A combination of t.he two method-.. 
generation and assertion, is convenient: 
Generating n·s from K's requires the adoption 
of some theory of probability. It could be as simple as 
taking statements in K to be constraints on 
distributions. or conditionalizing some prior on the 
contents of K. or it could be some theory of frequency­
based \lr chance-based direct in terence. 
Generating suce( K) amounts to making 
Jdditional assumptions. It could be done in a number 
of �Aays: one possibility is to use an acceptance rule 
tsee al'io below. on "higher-order" probabilities). Such 
J rule would describe when a statement is acceptable 
and IAOuld thus determine to which K's it belongs. I f  
the rule is based o n  probabilities relative to Kinit· for 
mstance, then .4 belongs to all those successor K ·s. Kj· 
such that 1 - P( A I Kinit) is less than the error 
associated with Kj. A differem probabilistic rule 
would take succ(K) to be K U {A}, where A is the next 
most probable statement relative to K. of statements of 
some special form. .\i ote that lA ith these rules. the K-
Therefore. different indeterminate probabilities. with sequence is ne-;ted. Acceptance rules in the literature 
different maximal sets. can be consulted for the are more elaborate. See (Kyb70j tor additional 
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acceptance rules and their evaluation. 
Decision-making amounts to exploring the n­
sequence in best-first order until either (l) the maximal 
set under n is a singleton. in which case the problem is 
solved: or (2) n is a singleton, which leaves the 
standard decision problem under risk: or (3) the error 
associated with n is intolerably large tor this decision 
problem. in which case MEU with no acceptable set of 
assumptions can legislate unambiguously. 
The reasonableness of this proposal depends on 
whether there is independent reason to use intervals of 
a particular width. [t may be that epistemological 
considerations require that certain intervals be used: 
e.g .. the narrowest intervals at .95 contidcnce [Kyb85J. 
But if not if confidence levels .94 and .96 arc also 
useable. then decision analysis might as well proceed 
informative. But if the maximal set under narrower 
intervals is unsatisfactory, and the limit of tolerable 
potential error has not been reached. why not use still 
narrower intervals? One is already willing to forego 
certainty, and the amount of certainty one is willing to 
forego depends on the other desiderata. including 
decisiveness. 
We still avoid error by using indeterminacy: we 
retain the early elements in the <nt> sequence. rather 
than settling immediately on the mosr �pecific clcmenc 
(or of some P. s.t. P E ni for all i). There may not be a 
most specific c lement m the sequence (this is exp lo red 
in example C. below). And there may be genuine 
instances in which no substantiable set of assumptions 
legislates a unique decision or formulates a standard 
risk problem . In such cases. indeterm inac y is required 
with imervals that are decisive. rather than w1th th11Se w indicate ignorance, or if either is possible. the need 
that are indecisive. There is no reason w avoid 
ll)lerablc error if doing so results in uninformative 
anal� SIS. 3 ff the \tl EL calculation is not satisfacwry 
under the assumptions held. it could be thar the agent 
has not assumed enough. The analy sis should then be 
founded on an ;ll!gmented set of assumptions. 
Conversely. there is no reason to invite error in 
the analysis if the analysis is already sufficiently 
informative. So of the many n·s that are decisive, the 
one that is least prone to error has epistemic priority. 
The augmented set of assumptions should be the next­
least in order of presumptiveness. No more 
assumptions should be made than are necessary for 
decision. 
Consider the claim that rational commitment 
ceases with the restriction to the maximal set. or that 
the agent must sometimes suspend judgemem when 
the set of maxima is not a singleton. Lopes. voicing a 
common intuition. quips that suspending judgement 
among choices with overlapping expected utility 
ranges is no more defensible than suspending 
judgement among choices with overlapping ilUtcome 
ranges [Lop83]. Lopes· remark is forceflll precisel:y 
for more sampling. or for suspension of judgement. 
For example, consider a probabil istic acceptance 
n!le: statements arc accepted in K( a) when their 
probability relative to K init exceeds l ---: a. For J 
decision problem where the maximum ratio of odds is 
w, it would be pointless to perform an M rT analy sis in 
some K(a) where a� 1- w. [fthe lottery pays 20: L 
w = .95. If all n·s based on less error than .05 are 
indecisive. no decision is legislated hce [ K y b85] and 
[Lou85] for discussion) . 
V. Examples and Contrasts. 
We discuss the following decision problem.
4 
Upon finding a berry, the agent has tO decide whether 
to eat it (a 1 ). or not to eat it (a 2). [fit is eaten. it 
matters whether or not it was a good berry (G). [f it is 
not eaten. it matters whether or not the agent later gets 
hungry(H). Let u(<a1 . G>) = 10: ut<a1. -(/)) = 
-30: u((a,, H>) = -10: and u((aJ,- H>l = 0. - -
A. !ower levei con_tidence intervals. 
Suppose the probability repons fnr (/and for H 
are based on Clopper· Pearson in ten als. Of 4 berries 
because it points out the arbitrariness <)finterval�Nidth . ..:aten. 4 �,�,ere good. On 14 excursions of this kind. the 
\Vhy in\ ite error by us ing intenais narrPY�er thJn (0. 
lj': Because [0. lj inten Jis are not �ausf.tctoni� 
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Jgcnt got hungr\ (without eaung) 3 times . .  \t .99 
-:on ridence. ?(({) = [.35 l] and PU{) = [0 . .55]. So 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
u( a 1) = [- 16.8, 10]; u(a2) = [- 5.5. 0]. The maximal 
set is (a 1. a 2}. But at the confidence level .75. P( (r) = 
[.75, 1] and P(H) = [.15, .3]. So u(a 1) = [0. 10]; u(a2) 
= [- 3, - l.S]. a 1 > a2. a 1 is uniquely maximal. Note 
that if a 1 and a 2 had been ranked by utility midpoints 
at .99, rnp 1 == - 3.4; mp2 = - 2.75; one would have 
concluded contrarily that a 2 > a 1! 
!3. direct inference and probabilistic acceptance rule. 
Suppose %(berries, good) = [.3, .8] and 
%(excursions. get-hungry) = (0, 1] and %(soft berries, 
good) = [.84, .88]. Presumably this is accepted based 
on sampling w1th. say, at least .999 confidence. If P(G) 
is based on the [.3, .8] interval. both a 1 and a2 are 
maximal. The decisive [.84 .. 88] interval can't be used 
for P( G) unless it is accep ted that the berry is soft. 
Even if there is independent reason to believe P( this 
berry E soft berries) = .999, the probability of G would 
be [.3 .. 8]. It's nawral to consider the acceptance of 
"this berry E soft berries". This allows direct inference: 
P(G) must be [.84 .. 88] if this is all that is known.s 
Decision to do a 1 is based on dominance with the 
narrower interval. 
C. convex Bayesian vs. Savage's Bayesian. 
A Bayesian who considers all the distributions in 
a closed con vex set can accept different constraints on 
this set at different levels of acceptance ( cf. [Lev80bj). 
Typical constraints could be conditions (as in example 
B). or bounds on marginal probabilities (as in example 
A). Additional knowledge can lead to additional 
constraints. which can decrease membership in n and 
so are more informative (though additional knowledge 
does not always lead to additional constraints: 
sometimes it em invalidate a constraint). Some 
constraints may not be as warranted as mhers. and 
their use introduces more possibility of error. If the set 
is indecisive, try the MEU analysis with the next set of 
constraints. 
Savage would have the agent settle on the most 
�peci fie set (if there is one). and eliminate the excess 
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indeterminacy ofthe preceding sets. !f all the sets are 
nested (for all i > j, nj :;? ni). there is no difference 
between the decisions made by this convex Bayesian 
and by Savage's Bayesian. 
But sets are not nested. The most obvious 
source of non-nesting is due to conditionalization.6 
Suppose n 1 is based on acceptance so stringent that 
probabilities are conditional only on A. n2 takes both 
A and Has conditions; B is acceptable as a condition at 
this level (perhaps B is treated by Jeffrey's rule m rJ 1: 
it doesn't matter here). Then there's no reason for n, 
to be a subset of n l· 
l.et A entail - H: P( G I A) = [.6, .8]: P( G I A. B) 
= [.3, .4]. Intuitively. A might be the conjunction "just 
tlte & !he berry looks good' while B might be "the 
lighting is misleading". n1. with P(G) = [.6, .8]. 
indicates both a 1 (eating) and a2 (not eating) as 
maximal. n 2 mandates a 2. with P( G) = [.3, .4], which 
is not a -;ub-interval of[.6, .8]. Now suppose the next 
decision involving P( (i) is a l: llotrery. 01 mandates 
entering the lottery, and because n 1 is decisive and 
epistemically prior, n 2 is ignored. Savage would 
continue to use P( G) from n2, and would avoid the 
lottery. 
So preservation of the "excess" indeterminacy 1s 
necessary despite temporary refinement for the 
purposes of the current decision. 
D. Shafer/an discounting. 
It's tempting to consider Shafer's discounting 
parameter to generate successive n's. 
The belief with mass 111( G) = . 7 and m(- G) = 
.3 is to be combined with a belief m( G) = .6: m(- I�) = 
.4 based on a new. independent source. The latter's 
impact IS to be discounted by -;omc amount r. Let - H 
be accepted. [ f r < .23. then P( (i) > .7 5. and a 1 = a*: 
otherwise a! = a*. Note that t()r any value of r here, 
the resulting probability of G is determinate. 
Are some values of r more cautious than others'? 
If r is large, the informative impact of the second belief 
is lessened, and it is combined with caution. But a 
cautious attitude toward the new belief is not 
necessarily a cautious attitude toward the possibility of MEU. 
error. unless the new belief is the only possible source There are enormous implications of this 
of error. When conditions were not accepted in 
example C. it was because they were relatively 
revelation-through-behavior stance for the 
management of knowledge bases. No matter how 
uncertain, not because they were new. Here. it may be tentative the decision, and whatever its content or 
that the full weight of the new belief is required to manner of selection, the knowledge base must 
avoid error. It would be erroneous. for instance. to represent only the distributions that are MEU-
ignore the new belief completely. The parameter r admissible for that decision. If only a single 
here ts being used like Carnap's A.. There is no distribution is MEU-admissible. then that distribution 
epistemic relation given between rand error. hence, no specifies the new state of the program's belief. And 
priority of one solution over the other. 
Perhaps caution should be reflected by 
discounting both belief functions. This begs the 
question, in what proportion should they be 
discounted? ff there are two parameters that can be 
varied. the n's generated will be only partially 
ordered. 
this has been done with the addition of no relevant 
empirical knowledge! All that distinguishes the new 
state from the old is the actualization of one particular 
problem stmcture. among the many that could have 
been faced. 
If the interpretation of probability is subjective 
as well as behavioral. the agent or reasoning system can 
It may be possible to use Shafer·s formalism to spuriously return to the more permissive credal state. 
generate then-sequence. but its use would require n. But if this is to be a mle for revision. there seems 
more argument. no point in making the contraction. If it is not a nde. 
then there is still the onerous possibility of spurious 
change to some other credal state, and worse. the 
VI. Epistemological Considerations. possibility <)f no change whatsoever after contraction. 
A. On Revisions of the Knowledge Base. Either course violates legitimate counterfactual 
A behavioral interpretation of probability 
suggests the identification of a* as additional evidence 
about probability judgement. Whatever the means of 
u*'s identification, there is a set.'!', of admissible 
probability distributions. according to each of which. 
u* is the unique maximum by \liEU means alone. 
Behaviorists hold that once u* is identitied. the agent's 
.:::rcdal state contracts to the more precise n·. the 
Intersection of'¥ :.md n. at least as a description 
appropriate at the time of decision. Presumably, if 
there ts no subsequent revision. the more precise 
description of past state continues to describe the 
current state. If this is right. then credal state depends 
intuitions pertaining to the past decision. Suppose the 
secondary method is always a tournament of coin­
flipping. Upon the last toss of heads. u J is chosen, and 
n· is obtained from n by the deletion of all 
distributions that do not mandate a 7. Thus. it no 
longer is the case that "had the toss been tails, a 1 
would have been mandated." though we quite 
reasonably take such to have been the case. 
Starr [Sta66] suggests a normative criterion for 
identifying the optimal act when n is not a singleton. 
Suppose the distributions in n can be parameterized 
by some 0. Suppose also that the set of parameter 
values e. corresponding to the n distributions. is 
on the decisions made. Faced with a different decision measured by an additive indifference "prior". So 
structure, a*. hence 'l', and tinally credal state, might subsets of n are also measured. Consider various acts. 
have been different. An act is mandated by each of its MEU-admissible 
Upon each decision. the agent must be distributions. which collectively form some subset 7T C 
consistent. in this behaviorally strong sense. Decisions n. Starr's cmerion chooses the c1ct with the 7T that 
dways reveal credal state and always do so through maximizes the measure (i.e .. that has the greatest 
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number of feasible admissible distributions). 
Starr's criterion is a prescription for decision. 
not for the adopt ton of a narrower credal state. 
Behaviorists would contract to w. 
Whatever the behaviorist arguments, the 
revelation of credal state through decisions and MEU 
is unattractive in A.L A system's probability estimates 
are based on objective analysis of samples, or on the 
opinions of experts, not on the future decision 
problems to be faced by the system. 
B. On Higher-Order Probabilities. 
Some Bayes1ans intuit the existence of"higher 
order" probabilities (e.g., [Goo83J). These would be 
probability distributions on probability distributions. 
formalized perhaps, like the indifference "prior" in 
Starr's criterion. 
If one approves of and has access to such 
measures. then acceptance can be based on the 
measure. For instance. successive fl's could be 
generated by eliminating the next-least probable 
members of the previous fl. This strategy leads to 
nested fl's; all decisions would be those mandated by 
the distribution with the greatest higher-order­
measure. It would not, in general, be the same as 
taking an expectation over the expected utility 
intervals, and ranking the resulting real-values: 
u(a;>.) = L{L [Pk(E1ia;x_)u(<E1, a;\>)]Al(Pk)} 
Vk Vi. 
where M is the higher-order measure. 
Perhaps the expectation is appropriate if there is 
such a measure. However. one should have misgivings 
about the identification of these measures. 
There may be uncertainty about the higher­
order measure, reflected in some still higher measure. 
This induces a hierarchy of measures. Presumably the 
height of the hierarchy is finite. There must be, at 
�orne high order, either a determinate measure. or else 
unmeasured indeterminacy. If the former. then one 
�hould be suspicious about the source of a determinate 
higher-order-measure: why is the probabili-ty of a 
distribution certain. but the distribution uncertam? 
!'he higher-level is not inherently more robust 1 note 
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that the order of the sums can be reversed). Just as a 
small error in a probability can change a decision, so 
can a small error in a higher-order probability change a 
decision. 
If on the other hand there is unmeasured 
indeterminacy, the expected-expected utilities will be 
intervals. This is essentially no different from the 
interval expected utilities from indeterminate zero­
order probabilities. 
So acceptance can be conceptually related to 
higher order probabilities, but is not immediately 
subsumed or improved by them. 
VII. Conclusion. 
A.I. systems that use interval judgements must 
sometimes solve partial ignorance decision problems. 
There are now two approaches. Maximizing expected 
utility can be followed by maximin, or some other 
secondary criterion. Alternatively. additional 
assumptions can be made that change probabilities, 
temporarily, so that maximizing expected utility is 
sufficient. This paper has discussed how to implement 
the latter approach. Assumptions are accepted in an 
order that tries to avoid error. and they arc accepted 
only temporarily, for the purposes of decision. 
There is still the problem of choosing an 
acceptance rule. which iteratively generates the next­
best assumption. This choice requires considerably 
more epistemological retlection. 
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VIII. Notes. 
1 By indeterminacy. we will mean indeterminacy broadly construed: potential indeterminacy, including 
the judgements Prob(A) E (0. 1] (complete) and Prob(A) E [.1, .1] (degenerate). Prob(A) E [.3 . .  7] 
(bounded). and [Prob(A) = .4 or Prob(A )  = .8] (disjunctive). 
2 Some have charged that the specification of an interval requires two numbers rather than one: hence. it 
requires more information. That's silly. Given that some quantity p is in fact 0.67, it follows that p is in 
the interval (0.34, 0.97]. Furthermore, in a very natural canonical form. namely, the number of hyper­
planar constraints required in the space of all probability distributions: the information (number of 
constraints) in interval reports of a particular probability is less than the information in point reports. 
Information measures are dependent on canonical form. hence can be misleading. 
Intervals are chosen because they offer robust behavior. If practice shows that they are not robust 
�nough, that endpoints matter critically, then future investigators can feel free to use a formalism with 
mdetermmate upper and lower bounds, or w1th fuzzy sets. Surely one would not revert to point 
probabilities because they contain "less information." 
3 Here, we've taken informativeness w.r.t. decision to be singulanty of fi or singularity of the maximal 
set. Other interpretations o f " in formative" are possible (such as any restnction of the maximal set to 
decisions which cannot differ in outcome more than € ). These lead to different decision theories. 
Also note that in [Lou85], the amount of tolerable error ts addresed (see the discussion of D­
meaningful corpora). 
4 We call this the problem of Jerry 's Berries. 
5 We've appealed to the epistemological conception of probability here. If explicit statement of chances 
is required. the example can be changed 
6 It's also possible to violate nesting when constramts are ordered jointly. and not all constraints are 
compatible. So tf c I' . . .  , c4 are constramts on fl's. IT1 may be delimited by {c 1} .  and IT2 by {c2}. and 
rr 3  by {c4} before n 3 by {c [' c2} n 5 may be delimited by {c f• c4} ,  where {c [' c2, c4} is over­
determinins. If constraints are accepted ( rather than knowledge that generates constramt), and 
acceptance IS purely probabilistic. then this kind of situation requires acceptance levels at or below .5 .  
With not purely probabilistic acceptance. this situation is more natural. 
Note that non-nested fi 's would seem irrational via a Dutch Book argument. but the agent still posts 
consistent odds whenever he considers two or more lotteries simultaneously. It's only when he posts odds 
independently and they are subsequently collected that leads to inconsistency. Consult the Ellsberg 
paradox for intuitions here. 
IX.  References 
Barnett. J. "Computational Methods for a Matl1ematical 
Theorv of Evidence," IJCAI 7. 
Cheeseman. P. " .  \ \-tet11od of Computing Generalized 
Bayesian Probability Values for Expert Systems." IJCAI 
8. 
Dempster. A. " .-\ Generalization of Bayesian 
Inference." J Roy. Stat. Soc. 2 
Dillard. R. "The Dempster· Shafer Theory Applied to 
Tactical Fusion in an Inference Svstem," Fifth 
MIT/0 '\/ R  Workshop. 
. 
Fishburn. P. · ·Analysis of Decisions with Incomplete 
Knowledge of Probabilities." Op. Res. 13. 
Garvey, T.. Lowrance, J., and Fischler. M. "An 
Inference Technique for Integrating Knowledge from 
Disparate Sources," IJCAI 7.  
Ginsberg, :\1:. " Non-monotonic Reasoning using 
Dempster's Rule," AAAI. 
Good. I. Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability 
and Its Applications. Minnesota. 
Good, l. and McMichael. A. "A Pra�mauc \Iodification 
of Explicauvity for tl1e Acceptance ot H) potheses." Phil. 
Sci. 51. 
Hurwicz. l.. "Some Specitlcauon Problems and 
Applications.�o Econometric .. '.-todels." Econometrica 19 
Kyburg, H. ConJuncm ttts. m Swam. \-I. ed . . 
Induction. Acceptance. and Rational Belief 
Dordrecht: ReideL 
Kyburg, H. The Logical Foundations ofStatisrica! 
Inference, Dordrecht: ReideL 
Kyburg, H. Science and Reason. manuscnpt. 
Levi. I. "Acceptance as a Basis for Inducuon. ·· m Cohen 
and Hesse. eds . . Applications oflnduc!IVe Logic Oxford. 
200 
[Lev80b] 
[Lop84] 
[Lou84] 
[Lou85] 
(Low82] 
(LuS84] 
[Nil84] 
[Qui83] 
[Sha76] 
[Sta66] 
[Str84l 
(TSD8 3] 
[WeH82] 
[Wes83] 
[WLG84] 
[Zad79] 
( evt l. The Enterprise of Knowledge. 'A IT. Cambridge 
Lopes. L " :-.iormattve Theones of Ratlonality: Occam ·' 
Razor. Procustes· Bed?" ( response to Kyburg). Behav. 
Brain Sci. 6. 
Loui. R. "Pnmer for tl1e Inexact Reasonmg Sesston." 
memorandum. 
Lout R " Decisions with Indeterminate Probabilities. ·  
submttted. 
Lowrance. J. " Dependency-Graph Models of Evidential 
Support," Ph.D. Thesis. U. Mass. Amherst. COINS TR. 
Lu. S. and Stephanou. H. " A  Set-theoretic Framework. 
for tl1e Processing of Uncertain Knowledge." AAAI.  
Nilsson. '\/. "Probabilistic Logic" SRI Tech. :-.iote 321 
Quinlan, J. "Consistency and Plausible Reasoning, " 
IJCAI 8. 
Shafer. G. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. 
Princeton. 
Starr. M. "A Discussion of Some :--lormative Criteria for 
Decision- Making under Cncertainty . "  Industrial 
Management Review 8. 
Strat. T. "Continuous Belief Functions for Evidential 
Reasoning," .\,\AI. 
Tong, R . .  Shaptro. D .  Dean. J. ,  and McCune. B. "A 
Comparison of Cncertainty Calculi in  an Expert System 
for Information Retrieval." IJCAI 8. 
Wesley. L. and Hanson. A. "The Cse of an Evidential 
Based Model for Representing Knowledge and 
Reasoning about Images in the Vision System," IEEE. 
Wesley. L "Reasoning about Control: The Investigation 
of an Evidenttal Approach." UCAI 8. 
Wesley, L.. Lowrance. J., and Garvey. T. " Reasoning 
about Control: An Evidential Approach."  SRI Tech. 
'-iotc 324. 
Zadeh. L. "On the Validity of Dempster"s Rule." L.C 
Berkeley/ERL M79124. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
